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IS A SCIENCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONALISM POSSIBLE?
HOW CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS MATTER. By Adam Chilton and
Mila Versteeg. New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 2020. Pp.
viii, 388. $99.00.

Reviewed by Madhav Khosla∗
INTRODUCTION
Nearly a generation ago, Justice Scalia and Justice Breyer debated
the legitimacy and value of using foreign law to interpret the American
Constitution.1 At the time, the matter was controversial and invited the
interest of both judges and scholars. Foreign law had, after all, been
relied on in significant cases like Roper v. Simmons2 and Lawrence v.
Texas.3 Many years on, there is still much to be debated — including
the purpose and potential benefits of judicial engagement with foreign
law — but “comparative constitutional law” has unquestionably
emerged as a field of study in its own right. We have seen the publication of scores of articles and books that compare constitutional systems
and elaborate reflections by judges over the nature and form
of comparative judicial reasoning.4 Today, it no longer seems necessary
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. For comments and criticism, I am grateful
to Bruce Ackerman, Ashraf Ahmed, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Aslı Ü. Bâli, Jessica Bulman-Pozen,
Sujit Choudhry, Rosalind Dixon, Noah Feldman, Stephen Gardbaum, Jamal Greene, David Singh
Grewal, Monica Hakimi, Bernard Harcourt, Samuel Issacharoff, Devesh Kapur, Jeremy Kessler,
Benjamin L. Liebman, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lev Menand, Gillian E. Metzger, Niels Petersen,
Katharina Pistor, David E. Pozen, Jedediah S. Purdy, Theunis Roux, Charles F. Sabel, Wojciech
Sadurski, Neelanjan Sircar, Richard Tuck, Mark Tushnet, Matthew C. Waxman, James Q.
Whitman, Taisu Zhang, and audiences at Columbia Law School, the UC Berkeley School of Law,
and Yale Law School.
1 See A Conversation Between U.S. Supreme Court Justices, The Relevance of Foreign Legal
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice
Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005). For an elaboration of Justice Breyer’s views, see
generally STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES (2015).
2 543 U.S. 551, 575–78 (2005).
3 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003).
4 The literature is too vast to reference meaningfully, but important casebooks and research
handbooks include COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon
eds., 2011); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Michel
Rosenfeld & András Sajó eds., 2012); ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2012); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2014); and THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Roger Masterman & Robert Schütze eds., 2019). For a helpful introduction to the field, see generally MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 2018).
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to demonstrate, as Professor Mark Tushnet once did, “the possibilities
of comparative constitutional law.”5
Though the study of comparative constitutional law may not quite
require a defense at present, much remains to be settled. In the late
1990s and early 2000s, the question — crudely put — was whether we
could compare the constitutional law of different nations. Could a comparison between rules and developments in country A and country B
occur in an intelligible and meaningful fashion? Though comparative
constitutional law was not new to the American legal academy, it had
declined in importance over the years, thereby requiring the field to
be somewhat reborn.6 Now that comparisons between constitutional
orders are commonplace, greater attention is being devoted to a different
question: how is comparative constitutionalism to be conducted?7
The question implicates tasks that stretch far beyond the judicial
citation of foreign legal materials. The recent crisis of constitutional
democracy and the phenomenon of democratic backsliding has, for example, led to an outpouring of comparative literature.8 It seems natural,
even important, to compare the authoritarian turn in, say, Hungary,
where Viktor Orbán was recently reelected as Prime Minister, with
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
5 Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1225 (1999).
6 On comparative constitutionalism’s historical fortunes, see generally David Fontana, The
Rise and Fall of Comparative Constitutional Law in the Postwar Era, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 1 (2011).
On the fortunes of comparative law more broadly, see generally Mathias Reimann, The Progress
and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMPAR.
L. 671 (2002).
7 See Mark Tushnet, Some Reflections on Method in Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE
MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS 67–83 (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); Vicki C. Jackson,
Comparative Constitutional Law: Methodologies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 4, at 54, 54–74; RAN HIRSCHL,
COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
(2014); Vicki C. Jackson, Comparative Constitutional Law, Legal Realism, and Empirical Legal
Science, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1359 (2016); Stephen Gardbaum, How Do and Should We Compare
Constitutional Law?, in COMPARING COMPARATIVE LAW 109 (Samantha Besson et al. eds.,
2017); Theunis Roux, Comparative Constitutional Studies: Two Fields or One?, 13 ANN. REV. L. &
SOC. SCI. 123 (2017).
8 See, e.g., David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 189 (2013);
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY IN CRISIS? (Mark A. Graber et al. eds., 2012); Kim Lane
Scheppele, Autocratic Legalism, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2018); TOM GINSBURG & AZIZ Z. HUQ,
HOW TO SAVE A CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (2018); Samuel Issacharoff, The Corruption of
Popular Sovereignty, 18 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1109 (2020). There have also been several countryspecific studies. See, e.g., ALLAN R. BREWER-CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN
VENEZUELA (2010); Nadiv Mordechay & Yaniv Roznai, A Jewish and (Declining) Democratic
State? Constitutional Retrogression in Israel, 77 MD. L. REV. 244 (2017); ANDRÁS L. PAP,
DEMOCRATIC DECLINE IN HUNGARY (2018); WOJCIECH SADURSKI, POLAND’S
CONSTITUTIONAL BREAKDOWN (2019); Michael J. Klarman, The Supreme Court, 2019 Term —
Foreword: The Degradation of American Democracy — And the Court, 134 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2020);
Madhav Khosla & Milan Vaishnav, The Three Faces of the Indian State, 32 J. DEMOCRACY 111
(2021).
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developments in countries such as India, Poland, Russia, Turkey, and
Venezuela — and perhaps to reflect on President Donald Trump’s term
in office in light of the global experience.9 But the ease of making such
comparisons masks the hard question of precisely how to conduct such
inquiries.
A recent wave of writing has offered a powerful and distinct answer
to this question. It urges us to consider global patterns that relate to
legal phenomena. It has suggested that we should observe variations in
behavior and offer generalizations in lawlike terms across cultures. In
other words, the aim has been to develop a kind of science of
comparative constitutionalism that can, among other things, offer causal
narratives that are cross-national. Such efforts — that are typically
“large-N” and involve a great many nations — are familiar to social
scientists.10 The potential uses and limitations of cross-country data to
test hypotheses, make observations, and present causal theories are also
well known to comparative law scholars who work in areas other than
constitutional law.11 Yet, in the field of comparative constitutional law,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See Francis Fukuyama, America: The Failed State, PROSPECT (Dec. 13, 2016), https://
www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/magazine/america-the-failed-state-donald-trump [https://perma.cc/
52RT-SG9C] (“The triumph of the Trump brand of nationalism is arguably of a piece with authoritarian advances in disparate countries, from Recep Tayyip Erdoğ an’s Turkey to Viktor Orbán’s
Hungary.”)
10 My interest lies in studies similar to those that Professor Alasdair MacIntyre scrutinizes in
his notable assessment of the science of comparative politics. See ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, Is a
Science of Comparative Politics Possible?, in AGAINST THE SELF-IMAGES OF THE AGE:
ESSAYS ON IDEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY 260 (1978). As readers will immediately notice — not
least of all in my title — my work draws on MacIntyre’s contribution in important ways. See id.
at 260–79.
11 For a helpful overview, see generally Holger Spamann, Empirical Comparative Law, 11 ANN.
REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 131 (2015). Within comparative law, the most important scholarship in this
regard has been in law and finance. See, e.g., Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External
Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113
(1998); Mark Roe, Legal Origin, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets, 120 HARV. L. REV. 460 (2006);
Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE
285 (2008); John Armour et al., How Do Legal Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country
Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker Protection, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 579 (2009);
John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An Empirical Test of
the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343 (2009); Curtis J. Milhaupt,
Beyond Legal Origin: Rethinking Law’s Relationship to the Economy — Implications for Policy, 57
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 831 (2009); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis,
Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
765 (2009); Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467
(2010); Daniel M. Klerman et al., Legal Origin or Colonial History?, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 379
(2011). I leave for a future occasion the question of whether — and if so how and to what
extent — my argument applies more broadly to comparative law. There has been much work
that considers comparability within comparative law. See, e.g., Mathias Siems, The Power of
Comparative Law: What Types of Units Can Comparative Law Compare?, 67 AM. J. COMPAR. L.
861 (2019). The question of empirical analyses has also been an important one in the context of
international law. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?,
112 YALE L.J. 1935 (2002); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Measuring the Effects of Human Rights
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the performance of large-scale statistical work that transcends national
boundaries and provides us with findings about the workings of different legal measures is a relatively new if burgeoning phenomenon. This
method has, as such, been subject to little interrogation.12
This new positivist approach has asked questions of considerable
importance. Such questions range from the value of constitutional rights
and guarantees, such as a prohibition on torture, to the role played by
legal institutions and structures, such as courts. The number and range
of countries that are evaluated make the enterprise all the more noteworthy. If its findings are indeed accurate, these findings may well encourage us to revisit some of the normative and descriptive assumptions
that have shaped constitutional theory for decades. In general, the
positivist work that has emerged is reasonably sensitive to expected
methodological concerns, such as controlling for confounding variables,
coding with care, and so forth. It is worth noting that I use the term
“positivist” because, strictly speaking, the work under consideration
need not be quantitative.13 Its key feature is a Martian perspective —
that is, the external observation of behavior. The Martian looks through
the telescope and sees what we do. But does the Martian understand
it?
Within this body of scholarship, few contributions have been as ambitious and thought-provoking as Professors Adam Chilton and Mila
Versteeg’s recent book How Constitutional Rights Matter. Chilton and
Versteeg’s focus is on “whether and how constitutional rights matter” (p.
6). In particular, they hope to shed light on the relationship between the
de jure protection for a right and the de facto reality of rights enjoyment
(p. 6). For instance, does a prohibition on torture decrease the instances
of torture (p. 6)? In pursuing such inquiries, the authors present an
overall theoretical framework that places emphasis on formal organizations in the enforcement of rights, considers data from 194 countries
over a six-decade period to assess rights practices, and supplements the
data with select, if limited, illustrative case studies, involving visits and
interviews, and certain survey experiments (pp. 13–14). Although the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
Treaties, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 171 (2003); Oona Hathaway, Testing Conventional Wisdom, 14 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 185 (2003); BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (2009); Samuel
Moyn, Do Human Rights Treaties Make Enough of a Difference?, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 329–47 (Conor Gearty & Costas Douzinas eds., 2012).
12 For a rare and valuable critique, see Niels Petersen & Konstantin Chatziathanasiou,
Empirical Research in Comparative Constitutional Law: The Cool Kid on the Block
or All Smoke and Mirrors?, 19 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1810 (2021). See also BRUCE ACKERMAN,
REVOLUTIONARY CONSTITUTIONS: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND THE RULE OF LAW
38–40 (2019).
13 The term “positivist” is not used as an alternative to “normative,” as it is often used nowadays,
but rather in the classical sense where one refrains from relying on attributions of mental states in
explaining social phenomena. On positivism in the social sciences, see MARTIN HOLLIS, THE
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 40–65 (rev. ed. 2002).
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data-driven work is supplemented in these ways, the authors make
it clear that their “primary method is large-N statistical analysis”
(p. 102).14
How Constitutional Rights Matter presents three key findings:
rights, by themselves, can achieve little in the face of government
action; certain rights “are harder to violate than others” when constitutionalized; and, finally, “including rights in a constitution is not a
panacea . . . [because] a government [that] is determined to erode the
protections provided by certain rights” will usually succeed in doing so
(p. 7). A central conclusion of the book is that “what matters is the type
of right being threatened, not the type of institutions in the country” (p.
48). As one might guess, the main target here is courts, whose importance has long been underlined by those who make the case for
rights.15 Chilton and Versteeg, by contrast, are keen to shift the focus
away from judicial institutions to the role of organizations. Rights that
are granted to organizations and rights that operate within organizations
are, they argue, better protected than other rights (pp. 6–12).
Whether the formal presence of a right has a bearing on the practical
realization of that right is a question whose significance cannot be overestimated.16 As the authors acknowledge, there are a wide range of
arguments that have been posited in favor of rights; and the lived experience of rights may encourage us to revisit some of these arguments (p.
60).17 It is one of the singular achievements of How Constitutional
Rights Matter that it encourages us to question familiar truths within
constitutional theory. In the book, the authors present “the most comprehensive dataset on constitutional rights compiled to date” (p. 81). In
working with this dataset, they take pains to establish the robustness of
their results: they compare countries that have and do not have a given
constitutional right; they compare countries before and after the adoption
of a right; they create control events that involve other countries that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 The supplementing of the large-N analysis not only is rather limited, as the authors themselves recognize, but also invites concerns. To present but one example, as Tushnet notes, the reliance on specific experts on issues of constitutional politics is potentially problematic because
their views will likely reflect their own political judgments and perspectives. See Mark Tushnet,
“Sometimes the Magic Works. Sometimes It Doesn’t”: A Comment on Chilton and Versteeg, U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE (Apr. 5, 2021), https://lawreviewblog.uchicago.edu/2021/04/05/cv-tushnet
[https://perma.cc/Q5TE-APK4].
15 For the definitive contribution that brings together courts and rights, see generally RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
16 Of course, we may believe that the formal recognition of a right is valuable regardless of the
consequences on the ground. Some of this value might pertain to other kinds of impacts that rights
recognition can have, and some would relate to how recognition constitutes citizens and their place
in society. On the former, see Andrew Keane Woods, Essay, Discounting Rights, 50 N.Y.U. J. INT’L
L. & POL. 509, 516 (2018).
17 The authors describe the continued debate across countries over which rights to include or
add into a constitution’s bill of rights.
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had or did not have the same right during the relevant time period;
and, finally, they build a regression model with control variables
(pp. 106–10).
Despite these efforts and the care that the authors take, there are key
questions about the kind of analyses undertaken in How Constitutional
Rights Matter. This Review explores some of these questions. It engages with certain studies and the broader conclusions advanced by
Chilton and Versteeg, both in their book and in some of their other joint
work, as well as other significant contributions that typify the positivist
turn in comparative constitutionalism.18 How Constitutional Rights
Matter is emblematic of this broader turn and should therefore be carefully considered in its own right as well as alongside other notable scholarship. This Review proceeds in three parts. It first explores the issue
of causality, with special attention to the phenomenon of redundant causation and to the attribution of causation. It then turns to questions of
culture, interpretation, and meaning, and underlines concerns relating
to identification. The concerns that arise from both causation and interpretation come together in important ways. Finally, this Review
highlights the idea of agency and the promise of constitutionalism. In
attending to questions of causation, interpretation, and agency, this
Review underscores the importance of context in making causal and interpretive claims and in regarding people as agents who have the power
to shape their collective political life. The potential limitations with
large-N analyses relate to the degree to which they attribute causation,
the extent to which they underemphasize differences in meanings and
practices in an attempt to arrive at thin universal descriptions, and the
ways in which they minimize how humans are actors and participants
in the cultures and communities that they create and inhabit. By studying the positivist approach, this Review hopes to engage not only with
expected concerns that might arise with regard to such an approach, but
also with the very types of studies that might be possible within comparative constitutionalism.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
18 Chilton and Versteeg commit themselves to one of the two main approaches described by
philosophers of the social sciences — a positivist one that treats social phenomena from the outside,
in contrast to an interpretive one that seeks to understand social actions in the terms used by actors
themselves. In my view, the latter is more suitable for social-scientific inquiries of certain kinds,
and I offer critical comments from the interpretive perspective. But, of course, I do not contend
that I have shown, as an absolute matter, that the interpretive perspective is better than the positivist one, for that question continues to divide philosophers of the social sciences.

2116

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 135:2110

I. CAUSATION
At the heart of the positivist turn in comparative constitutionalism
are claims about causation. More precisely, the approach rests on a theory of counterfactual dependence to present a case of causal relations.19
A relation between a specific legal development (say, the prohibition on
torture) and a phenomenon (in this case, the practice of torture) is presented to make a causal claim. One might argue, for example, that the
prohibition on torture has not impacted the practice of torture. This
seems simple enough, and we are all familiar with counterfactual reasoning. We routinely use such reasoning in our lives in the course of
making decisions and exercising choices. But how should such a theory
be deployed in the study of legal phenomena?
Let us stay with the torture example. Chilton and Versteeg note that,
“[a]s of 2016, 66 percent of countries constitutionally prohibited torture,
while in 1946, only 41 percent of countries did” (p. 136). Given the rise
in the prohibition of torture, what might be said about the presence of
torture prohibitions and de facto torture? How Constitutional Rights
Matter presents us with the following conclusions: first, “between countries with and without the right, countries with constitutional torture
prohibitions typically see more torture”; second, “countries that constitutionally ban torture do not torture less in the first five years after [prohibiting torture]”; third, “this trend is similar for the control group of
countries that did not change their torture provisions during that same
period”; and fourth, “there is no difference in rates of torture between
countries with a torture prohibition and those without” (pp. 146–47).
The work here is “further corroborated by” a prior study by Chilton and
Versteeg that establishes the same conclusion (p. 147).20 The earlier
study was, like the one in How Constitutional Rights Matter, performed
with caution. The authors acknowledged, for example, that countries
with a better record on rights may well be less likely to adopt a prohibition on torture, and thus ratification of specific treaties may well be
endogenous to the practices prevalent within states.21 They also attended to the problem of false negatives and false positives by focusing
on transitioning democracies. The logic behind this diachronic emphasis was that the “combination of not-yet-exemplary rights records, possibilities for local advocacy, and good intentions may make transitioning
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19 Standard examples in the study of causation describe an action and an outcome. For example,
if a person throws a pottery bowl across the room, it will break. The counterfactual thought is that
if the person had not thrown the pottery bowl, it would not have broken. The theory at work here
is the counterfactual theory of causation.
20 See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions, 44
J. LEGAL STUD. 417, 446 (2015).
21 Id. at 430.
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democracies more likely to change their behavior because of constitutional torture prohibitions.”22
The conclusion that Chilton and Versteeg present is a dramatic one:
a major legal development, they suggest, has made no difference to reality. It is therefore worth reflecting on this conclusion carefully. Does
the fact that torture has become more widely prohibited across the world
and the fact that torture rates remain the same mean that such prohibitions have had no impact? It is not clear that this is the case because it
may well be that during the same period that torture became legally
prohibited, it also became more socially acceptable.23 If explanations of
this kind — say, the rising social acceptability of torture — have any
plausibility, then it could mean that the practice of torture had far
greater acceptability than was previously the case, and, if there had been
no legal prohibition on torture, torture rates would have increased substantially. In such a scenario, the prohibitions on torture have made a
major difference precisely because they have maintained torture rates
and have not allowed them to increase. The issue, in a case like this,
seems to be that culture may also be shifting. The authors make a number of efforts to add precision to their analysis, but attempts to mitigate
this problem cannot quite provide an assessment of the forces and countervailing forces within each single country. In the absence of such an
assessment, the facts as they are presented are compatible with the conclusion that the prohibition on torture succeeded in preventing the practice from rising in the face of dramatic shifts taking place in a given
society. We do not observe what torture rates would have been had the
prohibition not taken place. As such, the counterfactuals are imputed.
Even if we choose not to challenge the premises of the claim presented,
the conclusion here does not seem to follow from them.24
Similar concerns arise in the study of “organizational rights,” like the
freedom of religion. On this matter, How Constitutional Rights Matter
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22
23

Id. at 440.
One could multiply explanations along such lines. To offer a different account, one might say
that torture could be more likely to occur when overall violence is greater. The set of independent
countries in 1946, when a far fewer percentage of countries prohibited torture, was a third compared
to 2016, when a far greater percentage did so. The new states were, in other words, young states.
Given that violence is often seen as a feature of state making, the older states may well have experienced torture in prior centuries. On violence and state making, see generally Youssef Cohen et
al., The Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
901 (1981).
24 See IAN HACKING, AN INTRODUCTION TO PROBABILITY AND INDUCTIVE LOGIC 3–7
(2001) (on the nature of arguments). It should be noted that given the difficulty in measuring acts
like torture, there are likely to be important questions about the data in question. Some of these
concerns have been raised by others. See, e.g., Woods, supra note 16; Petersen & Chatziathanasiou,
supra note 12. The question of cross-national measurements and the variety of the concerns that
they raise have appeared in many contexts. A prominent example is global poverty estimates. See
generally Sanjay G. Reddy & Thomas Pogge, How Not to Count the Poor, in DEBATES ON THE
MEASUREMENT OF GLOBAL POVERTY 42 (Sudhir Anand et al. eds., 2010); Sanjay Reddy &
Rahul Lahoti, $1.90 a Day: What Does It Say?, 97 NEW LEFT REV. 106 (2016).
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concludes that “countries that constitutionally protect religious freedom
show more respect for this right in practice than countries without this
right” (p. 231). The authors “attribute this finding to the organizational
character of religious rights” (p. 231) — that is, to the power that religious groups enjoy to safeguard their rights. Again, the methodology is
carefully constructed. It compares countries that recognize the right
with those that do not; it contrasts the situation in countries before and
after the adoption of the right; it considers countries that did not protect
the right during the same period, using them as controls; and it performs
a regression analysis with specific controls that are taken to shape religious freedom. Overall, the results “suggest that the freedom of religion
is associated with higher de facto respect for religious freedom” (p. 248).
Despite the thoroughness with which the analysis is performed, we are
confronted with the question of whether we can capture changes in the
internal conception of religious freedom within a country. The respect
for religious freedom may well be a consequence of an altered approach
to the freedom of religion in society. Perhaps respect for religious freedom was rising within a society, and the juridification of religious freedom in the form of a right interfered with this and reduced the pace by
which the respect for religious freedom increased.
We notice this challenge when we consider one of the major conclusions of How Constitutional Rights Matter: the potentially limited role
that courts can play in the protection of rights (pp. 50–53). Chilton and
Versteeg have developed this insight more fully in other work.25 In such
work, they primarily study independent courts and conclude that the
presence of such courts does not increase the respect that governments
have toward rights. In other words, judicial institutions do not have
much ability to protect rights, a conclusion that calls into question much
of the literature that makes the case for judicial review.26 The authors
posit a range of possible explanations for such a result: political branches
might punish courts if they challenge the government, courts lack the
institutional capacity to address adequately certain kinds of rights-based
challenges, and so forth. Importantly, however, courts in this study are
examined qua elements of political culture rather than qua courts. The
key control is whether or not the relevant country has a court:
“We . . . explore whether this relationship between de jure and de facto
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25 See Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability to Protect Constitutional
Rights, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 293 (2018) [hereinafter Chilton & Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability]; see
also Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Do Constitutional Rights Make a Difference?, 60 AM. J.
POL. SCI. 575 (2016).
26 This is because if courts cannot do very much, then we might wonder why they should exist
at all. Of course, noninstrumentalist arguments for judicial review do exist. See, e.g., ALON
HAREL, WHY LAW MATTERS 191–224 (2014). But if the outcomes generated by courts are indeed
without consequence, then such process-based calls for review may well struggle to be persuasive.
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rights is different in countries that have an independent judiciary
equipped with the power of judicial review (a ‘Constitutional Court’).”27
But such a framing is, of course, compatible with courts actually enjoying a great deal of influence. Countries that establish constitutional
courts could be systematically different from those that do not along a
set of characteristics that are associated with the future breakdown of
constitutional rights. The facts are consistent with the possibility that,
in countries where courts are needed, they perform extremely well —
perhaps, in such countries, courts make it possible to maintain the gap
between a constitutional text and the social reality, and they prevent the
gap from widening.
The kind of concern that I have raised with the causal analysis presented in How Constitutional Rights Matter may be borne out by
turning to some broader literature within the positivist approach to comparative constitutionalism. Consider a key study by Professors Tom
Ginsburg and James Melton on constitutional amendment rules.28 The
authors begin with the widely held concern that the American
Constitution is, as a formal matter, extraordinarily difficult to amend.29
For comparative scholars, this feature of the American Constitution has
long stood out when one notices the procedures in other countries, and
Ginsburg and Melton perform a great service in helping us better understand its implications. They wonder whether the formal amendment
process in the United States accurately reflects the reality of constitutional practice. Is the formal procedure for amending America’s
Constitution the reason its text has not been changed as easily as that of
some other constitutions? What is the right way to measure constitutional flexibility? Departing from the conventional answers to this last
question — answers that stress the textual requirements for amending a
constitution — the authors turn to the idea of an amendment culture.
Using a cross-national database, they “develop a proxy for amendment
culture and show empirically that this does a better job of explaining
patterns of amendment within constitutional systems than do any of the
institutional indices or variables on offer.”30
Taking into account a number of variables relating to amendment
procedures (such as the stages involved in passing an amendment), the
authors are able to predict the probability of amendments. What is
important is their interest in the broader political culture. As they put
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27
28

Chilton & Versteeg, Courts’ Limited Ability, supra note 25, at 313.
Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Does the Constitutional Amendment Rule Matter at All?:
Amendment Cultures and the Challenges of Measuring Amendment Difficulty, 13 INT’L J. CONST.
L. 686 (2015).
29 Id. at 686. For a recent reflection on the American amendment procedure, see David E. Pozen
& Thomas P. Schmidt, The Puzzles and Possibilities of Article V, 121 COLUM. L. REV. 2317 (2021).
30 Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 28, at 687.
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it, “we regress the amendment rate on a set of amendment procedure
variables as well as on a host of factors that should predict political
reform more generally.”31 Thus, it is the defining feature of their study
that they “take into account social and political factors that are likely to
put pressure on countries to amend the constitution.”32 A measurement
of amendment culture is undertaken through a proxy — they “operationalize amendment culture as the rate at which a country’s previous
constitution was amended,” with the idea being that “attitudes toward
amendment will be expressed through amendment practices, and that
these attitudes will endure in the form of norms that outlast any particular set of institutions.”33 The ultimate interest of the study lies, of
course, in determining the relative importance of amendment procedures and amendment cultures, and the conclusion of the study validates
the authors’ investment in the latter: “The best predictor of constitutional amendment rates, it turns out, is what we have called an
amendment culture, as measured by the frequency of amendment in the
country’s previous constitution.”34
Ginsburg and Melton note that “attitudes about amendments matter,” and they try to demonstrate the limitations of schematic studies of
constitutional orders that do not pay due attention to the cultural forces
that shape political behavior and generate institutional outcomes.35 The
inattention toward culture that they identify is, without question, a mistake. It is an achievement of the Ginsburg-Melton analysis that they
underline this point. However, it is not entirely clear whether their study
helps us to remedy matters. The authors view culture as something that
persists (though they often observe that it can change).36 By definition,
there must be something other than the structure of a constitutional system that is shaping outcomes; as they observe, “barriers to amendment
are not merely institutional.”37 But the potential shortcoming here appears to be that, in trying to understand the relationship between cultural attitudes and procedural rules, we cannot ignore the possibility
that the nature of procedural rules may well be part of existing cultural
attitudes.38 The study does not seem to show that structural constraints
are of little relevance, quite simply because the constraints may shape
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38

Id. at 695.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.
Id. at 712.
Id. at 699–700.
Id. at 699.
The authors mention a version of this possibility in passing in the conclusion to the paper,
even though it raises fundamental concerns for the entire study: “Note that our measurement choice
allows amendment culture to vary over time, and so is not simply a reflection of unobserved national features that are fixed. It may be that amendment culture is shaped by institutions, but with
significant lags. We leave it to further work to specify the precise relationship between amendment
culture and institutional factors.” Id. at 712.
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culture and the dispositions that people hold. In other words, human
beings may well absorb the procedural rules into their understanding;
structure and culture may not be independent from one another.
Because of this interconnection, we cannot confidently conclude that the
amendment procedure is of little significance. Both culture and procedure may well be determined by similar factors, and in turn by one
another.
These concerns do not arise because of an imperfect analysis.
Ginsburg and Melton perform the study as carefully and thoughtfully
as anyone can. What cross-national causal studies involve, however, is
abstraction from context, and without context it is hard to present a
causal account. The challenge arises from the method itself, a matter
that is captured by an essay on constitutional efficacy.39 Here, Ginsburg,
Melton, and Professor Zachary Elkins observe that the efficacy of constitutions changes over time, and they critique the assumption within
constitutional theory that constitutional efficacy is broadly constant.40
Their specific focus is on rights — that is, on whether rights become
more or less effective with the passing of time.41 The study considers
two possible effects of age. The first is a maturation effect, where “the
gap between the demands of the constitution and social reality shrinks
over time,” a result that “could be because norms grow to be more venerated with age.”42 With veneration, the authors observe, enforcement
is likely to increase, and thus we are likely to witness greater compliance.43 In contrast, the second effect of age might be a “drift or even
decay of constitutional norms as society shifts away from norms that
once made sense,” and it is some shared understanding rather than the
content of the provisions themselves that seems to matter.44
Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton acknowledge that both these processes
can occur simultaneously.45 Over time, some aspects of a constitution
may mature while others may decay, and how we assess a constitution
would be an aggregate of how its different provisions are performing.46
Rather than draw conclusions about entire constitutions, they consider
individual provisions to assess maturation and provide an empirical account of the efficacy of constitutional rights over time.47 But notice how
this framing has the potential of missing the key point that veneration
and decay can occur for the same thing at the same time. If this is the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg & James Melton, Time and Constitutional Efficacy, in
ASSESSING CONSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE 233, 233–67 (Tom Ginsburg & Aziz Huq eds.,
2016).
40 Id. at 233.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 234.
43 Id. at 234–35.
44 Id. at 235.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 235–36.
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case, then one simply cannot get a measurement of veneration versus
decay and one cannot assess maturation through the method that is
adopted. What the analysis can at best reveal is an overall story — say,
over time there was slightly more veneration rather than decay — but
it cannot, given its abstracted character, capture the dynamic that is
being undertaken because it cannot tell us how the forces influencing
veneration and decay interact with one another at any given point. To
provide a concrete example, the British monarchy may well be an institution around which there is both veneration and decay. To understand
why the monarchy survives, one would need an account of how the
competing forces are interacting with one another at any given moment.48 Here, even though one is attempting to tell a causal story, there
does not quite seem to be a causal account on offer. Consider the following paragraph:
The point is that gaps between text and practice — the usual way of approaching the question of whether rights “work” — are a poor indicator of
constitutional efficacy because gaps do not indicate when or how a constitution makes a difference. Frequently, constitutional changes reveal the
extent of a problem that previously was thought to be much smaller and so
can motivate improvements. Methodologically, then, as an alternative to
looking at gaps, we might instead see whether there was political and social
mobilization around the constitution, which would indicate a causal mechanism. For example, if interest groups demanded enforcement of the
constitutional right to housing, or if the government initiated a housing program in response to a court order, then one might say that the constitution
has made a difference, assuming that the government program actually reduced homelessness. Thus, to say a constitution matters, one looks not only
to the outcome of a reduction in the gap between text and practice but also
to the channels by which it did so. Mechanisms are essential to understand
efficacy, as they are for any causal study. Our chapter aspires to push scholars to the level of mechanism analysis, though we recognize our own current
gap in promise and delivery.49

The goals outlined in this paragraph are laudable ones, except that
they depart from the analysis offered. It is precisely the mechanisms
regarding the gap between text and practice that become challenging to
study through a positivist lens. If one wants an account of the separation between text and practice at any given point, then it seems that one
would need an account of the relationship between the forces shaping
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48 Bertrand Russell, of course, had one explanation for the survival of the monarchy, ironically
enough in an essay on causation: “The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster
among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is
erroneously supposed to do no harm.” Bertrand Russell, On the Notion of Cause, 13 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 1, 1 (1913).
49 Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 39, at 238–39.
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veneration and decay at a particular point — how those forces interact
with one another, and the reasons why some forces triumph over others.50 Without this, it would be a little difficult to arrive at the conclusion that Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton reach. They determine that
there is a “relatively small” maturation effect, conditional on regime type
and judicial independence, and that this small effect is “remarkably stable across groups of rights.”51 But such a conclusion is consistent with
a scenario where rights have an enormous amount of causal significance,
but have, on balance, limited impact because their power is being counteracted by other forces.
Whether legal measures can make any real difference is similarly
posed in a Melton and Ginsburg study on judicial independence.52 In
this case, the authors observe that the past few decades have witnessed
greater sensitivity to judicial independence, and that this has manifested
in new constitutions containing explicit provisions that intend to protect
the independence of the judiciary (such as security of tenure, remuneration, and so forth).53 Given this changed landscape, they ask whether
the rise in de jure judicial independence has led to a rise in de facto
judicial independence. Does the presence of formal legal protections in
the case of judicial independence result in judges in fact being more
independent? Here, the conclusion that is offered is slightly less skeptical about the nature of the connection than in the aforementioned studies: “[D]e jure judicial independence is correlated with de facto judicial
independence, but the effect is limited to those provisions that are selfenforcing as a result of competition between the executive and legislative branches.”54
This study suggests that many forms of de jure protections to enable
judicial independence do not lead to de facto changes. It hopes to capture the difference between protections that do make a difference (those
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
50 It is worth noting, as an additional matter, that the examples in the excerpted paragraph are
themselves not quite convincing. In the case of interest groups seeking enforcement of a right, for
instance, it is hard to simply assert that the constitution has made a difference. Such a factor may
be neither necessary nor sufficient but merely evidential — in other words, it might simply be evidence for the fact that some phenomenon is occurring, but it may not establish a causal relationship.
One should not assume that merely because interest-group litigation of a certain kind is present in
situations involving welfare rights that such litigation has caused such rights to be enforced. Even
in How Constitutional Rights Matter, we can see that a potentially evidential matter is taken to be
a causal one. In the case of religious freedom, for example, the authors state: “While it is difficult
to establish the counterfactual — that is, how these same groups would have fared without the
constitution — it is unclear why religious organizations would use the constitution if it did not help
them” (p. 243).
51 Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 39, at 263.
52 See James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?: A
Reevaluation of Explanations for Judicial Independence, J.L. & CTS. 187, 189 (2014).
53 Id. at 188.
54 Id. at 209.
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that focus on the appointment and removal of judges) and those that do
not.55 To see the potential limitations in this study, consider two separate observations made by the authors. The first is that countries might
find it tempting to formalize judicial independence when the judiciary
already has credibility; and, thus, “we might observe constitutionalization of de jure independence after increases in de facto independence.”56
In other words, they note that it “would not be surprising to find a reciprocal relationship between de jure and de facto independence,” and
they register their interest in observing the correlation at work.57 The
second observation is the authors’ response to the potential concern that
“some unobserved factor may be causing any correlation that we find
between de jure and de facto judicial independence.”58 Milton and
Ginsburg proceed to state that:
For instance, deference toward the judiciary may be a societal norm, which
prompts constitutional drafters to create strong protection for the judiciary’s
independence and politicians to respect the judiciary’s independence in
practice. We cannot rule out this possibility in the analysis below, but our
emphasis on the specific mechanisms of appointment and removal suggests
that there is something about these particular attributes of de jure judicial
independence. If a third factor was causing both stronger formal protections and de facto independence, one might expect that all of the formal
protections that we identify would be equally correlated with practice.59

Both of these observations are intended to insulate the findings from
the potential criticism that there is no correlation to be observed — that
is, from the claim that provisions relating to judicial independence in a
constitutional text do not make any difference to the reality of judicial
independence on the ground. Even though the major part of their conclusions is consonant with this thought, the observations are meant to
defend the narrow set of instances where they find that de jure protections do indeed matter (instances, as we observed, relating to the
selection/removal of judges). But, we might ask, what if we do not raise
this expected objection to the analysis but instead address the large
chunk of situations where the authors find that de jure safeguards have
no impact? What if we turn our attention to situations where they “find
that none of the de jure attributes has an independent and statistically
significant effect on de facto judicial independence when control variables are included”?60 Here, it does seem that we have an analogous
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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56
57
58
59
60

Id. at 195.
Id. at 194.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 194–95.
Id. at 203. This finding is the one that the authors use to “reconcile” an existing body of
literature that reports the opposite result with “the common perception that parchment barriers are
insufficient to create judicial independence in practice.” Id. at 189. For the alternative viewpoint
that Melton and Ginsburg address, see generally Bernd Hayo & Stefan Voigt, Explaining De Facto
Judicial Independence, 27 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 269 (2007).
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situation to that observed in the aforementioned studies. The impact of
de jure protections might well have been extraordinary, but, in specific
societies, their presence might have had to contend with factors that
made a de facto change difficult. One reason why such a hypothesis is
far from implausible is that the factors that enable de facto independence are complex and varied — a matter underlined by the fact that we
can have de facto independence with de jure dependence, and we can
have de jure independence with de facto dependence. In the United
Kingdom, for example, judges were appointed by the Lord Chancellor
with no political restrictions until the Constitutional Reform Act 2005,61
but there were no serious concerns about a lack of judicial independence
in the country. Alternatively, as regards de jure powers, an important
feature associated with them in many liberal democracies is that they
are often not used. The Queen’s veto in the United Kingdom is, of
course, a common example.62
In discussions on causal studies in comparative constitutionalism, the
concern that is typically expressed is that of an omitted-variable bias.63
The scholarship that I have studied is usually very thoughtful in this
regard. In How Constitutional Rights Matter, for example, Chilton and
Versteeg are sensitive to this matter. They acknowledge this concern
and try to meet it by supplementing their statistical efforts with additional statistical efforts. As they observe, their work relies on “ten different models to estimate the effect of each of the rights.”64 But though
this effort is of course commendable, it is not entirely clear that it does
the required work. The effort to remedy a problem within a model may
not quite be resolved by additional modeling if the limitation is arising
because of the methodology of modeling and not the particular model in
question. If the problems arise because it is only a contextually sensitive
understanding — and likely one that cannot be entirely reduced to a
quantifiable unit — that can hold some promise of ascribing causation
by offering us the dynamics that interact with one another at any given
time and space to produce a causal effect, then a new model may not
quite help us. One might also separately note that the use of multiple
models will have limited value beyond a point because many outcomes
are likely to be highly correlated — the social and cultural variables that
are missing in one analysis are likely to be missing in others, cautioning
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
61
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Constitutional Reform Act 2005, c. 4 (UK).
Notably, the veto was not even exercised in the recent controversial prorogation of
Parliament. See R v. The Prime Minister [2019] UKSC 41. The impact of the nonuse of de jure
powers is, of course, an interesting matter. See generally Adrian Vermeule, The Atrophy of
Constitutional Powers, 32 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 421 (2012).
63 For an emphasis on omitted variable biases, see Petersen & Chatziathanasiou, supra note 12,
at 4–7. For an early reflection on this problem in the context of comparative constitutionalism, see
Tushnet, supra note 5, at 1265–69.
64 Adam Chilton & Mila Versteeg, Measurement and Causal Identification in Constitutional
Law: A Reply to Niels Petersen and Konstantin Chatziathanasiou, 19 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1842,
1847 (2021).
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us against treating each model as an independent piece of evidence. In
large-scale comparative efforts, the potential problems rise to a whole
new level because the social and cultural factors at play will, given the
variations involved, be irreducible in different ways in different
contexts.
To appreciate the kind of problem that I am gesturing at, we must
go beyond merely thinking about omitted variables and focus on the
ascription of causality. In order to do so, we must interrogate the counterfactual theory that is being utilized in How Constitutional Rights
Matter and other positivist work. Simply put, counterfactual accounts
rest on the idea that an outcome does not obtain if a particular action is
not performed. But such a simple description is not, of course, enough
for a causal theory to be successful. If, for example, we assert that the
nonperformance of X act by A implies that Y event does not occur, then
our assertion is incomplete. This is because, for our account to work, it
additionally needs to be the case that A does not perform some other
action that brings Y about. As it has been observed, in an example
where “Suzy throws a rock at noon, breaking a bottle,” the analysis
“must be supposing that, in the relevant counterfactual situation in
which Suzy is not, at noon, throwing a rock at the bottle, she is not
doing anything else that would lead to a bottle-breaking: she is not starting to run up towards the bottle to level a kick at it; she’s not throwing
some other object at it; she’s not shooting her slingshot at it; etc.”65
There can be causation without any counterfactual dependence, and
there can be a lack of counterfactual dependence without a lack of causation.66 As Professor Michael Moore once put the matter in plain and
simple terms, “causation is distinct from counterfactual dependence.”67
The aforementioned example of Suzy and the bottle appeals to the
phenomenon of redundant causation — a situation that is typically understood to be one “where there is more than one event that is, in some
sense, enough for the effect that occurs.”68 Seen as one of the trickiest
issues in the philosophy of causation, the phenomenon of redundant causation calls into question the validity of numerous straightforward counterfactual causal accounts that seem, on the face of it, to be plausible.69
There are, as one might imagine, many ways for phenomena to occur.
For example, there may be cases involving common causes; there may
be situations of preemption, of both early and late kinds; and there may
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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L.A. PAUL & NED HALL, CAUSATION: A USER’S GUIDE 49–50 (2013).
See MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW,
MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS 410–25 (2009).
67 Id. at 426.
68 PAUL & HALL, supra note 65, at 70.
69 See id.
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be cases of overdetermination.70 And there can also be omissions that
result in causation, a fact that reminds us that our interest cannot only
lie in whether the performance of X act by A is enough for the occurrence of Y event by itself, but must also lie in actions that can interfere
and intervene in the causal account.71
For present purposes, we may limit our focus to the fact that sometimes an outcome can obtain even if the action that we associate with
the outcome is not performed. Professor Richard Tuck provides us with
a helpful example in this regard by asking us to consider “the case of a
policeman who shoots and kills a bank robber, and does so a split second
before one of his colleagues would have done.”72 Here, Tuck observes:
“The first policeman caused the robber’s death — if his action did not
do so, what did? But if this policeman had not fired, the robber would
still have been killed.”73 The basic upshot is that, if we are to retain
some notion of the idea of causation, then an easy counterfactual story
may not do all the work that is required. An act can have a causal role
to play in the generation of an outcome even if, in the absence of the
act, a counterfactual narrative does not give way to a different outcome.
This reminds us that when we think about actions — when we attribute causality — we are thinking about sufficiency.74 A person who
performs an action asks whether or not their action will bring about the
outcome that they desire — that is, whether their action will be sufficient to bring out this outcome. Our interest is not in necessity. Even
if an outcome might have come about in some other way, and therefore
the act in question was not necessary to bring about the outcome, a
causal relationship is established if the action was enough for the outcome to occur. Simply put, causation takes place when our actions are
adequate for something to happen. The emphasis on sufficiency rather
than necessity makes it very difficult to explain matters in entirely counterfactual terms. This is because causal theories that rest on counterfactual foundations operate within the framework of necessity.75
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70
71

See id. at 70, 74, 99, 143.
See id. at 193. The problem of redundant causation is challenging for the further reason that
there may be instances, especially those involving joint causation, where one cannot establish redundancy. See David Coady, Preempting Preemption, in CAUSATION AND COUNTERFACTUALS
325, 326–27 (John Collins et al. eds., 2004).
72 RICHARD TUCK, FREE RIDING 51 (2008).
73 Id.
74 See id. at 57–60. For John Stuart Mill’s account of causation — and his emphasis on sufficiency over necessity, upon which Tuck draws — see JOHN STUART MILL, A SYSTEM OF LOGIC,
RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE 306–14 (J.M. Robson ed., 1981) (1843).
75 As Moore observes: “The crucial notion in the sufficiency theory of causation is that of sufficiency. Idiomatically, the idea is that a cause is something that guarantees that its effect will follow
(and in that sense a cause ‘makes’ its effect happen). This stands in marked contrast to the counterfactual theory of causation, where the crucial notion is that of necessity (a cause is something
necessary for the effect to occur, ie [sic] without which the effect would not have occurred).”
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The examples that we have studied, in How Constitutional Rights
Matter and elsewhere, relate to the phenomenon of redundant causation
in an interesting way. In ordinary cases of redundant causation, we are
dealing with situations where an outcome would have come about even
if one did not act — and the key point here, as we have noted, is that
despite this fact, we still regard it to be a case of causation.76 In some
of our examples, though, the facts are somewhat different. Here, the
cases do not involve the same outcome being generated regardless of
whether or not one acts but instead relate to the same absence of an
outcome. In these situations, it does not follow that there is no causal
role being played by the law or the legal institution because it may well
be that the persistence of the phenomenon is now occurring because of
a new phenomenon or because of some additional existing phenomenon.
Thus, it may well be that there are other barriers apart from the law to
the creation of a society that is free of torture, and it may well be that
the legal prohibition on torture has broken down one important barrier.
As Moore observes in Causation and Responsibility, “cases (of more
than one sufficient condition for an effect) bedevil the counterfactual
theory of causation, because if each of two or more conditions is sufficient for e then none of such conditions is (individually) necessary for
e.”77 As one can easily notice, situations like this “present no equivalent
problem for a sufficiency theorist; that each condition is sufficient is
enough to count it as a cause, irrespective of the fact that such condition
is not necessary.”78 It is not fantastic to suppose that an outcome like
the end of torture may well be conditional on additional factors beyond
changes in legal rules. Inverting the standard examples, we might say
that even if the legal prohibition on torture was not sufficient to end
torture, it does not follow that it had no potential impact. The fact that
something (such as a legal measure) was not sufficient to bring about an
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
MOORE, supra note 66, at 474; see also JON ELSTER, NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES 6 (1989) (“[C]ausal explanations must be distinguished from assertions about necessitation.”). The determination of legal responsibility is, of course, a somewhat different matter to the
determination of the workings of a factual phenomenon, but even here it is worth underlining
Professors H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré’s important observation that “for the exposition of the
law we need the idea that a cause may be merely sufficient for the occurrence of an effect that has
happened, and that there are genuine cases of causal overdetermination.” H.L.A. HART & TONY
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW xlii (2d ed. 1985). To attribute a causal role to one’s conduct,
the emphasis is on the conduct being “normally a necessary element in a complex of conditions
together sufficient to produce it.” Id. at xlviii; see also id. at 109–14. The reason why an assessment
of phenomena is different from assessments of legal responsibility is at least partly because the latter
is concerned not only with whether an event takes place but also with the specific agent that is
involved. The individuation of the inquiry is brought into sharp focus in challenges involved in
the establishment of proof. By way of an illustration one might consider the issue of probabilistic
liability. See SANDY STEEL, PROOF OF CAUSATION IN TORT LAW 290–369 (2015).
76 The first policeman shooting the robber is a case of redundant causation because, if he did
not shoot him, the robber would have died because of an action by the second policeman.
77 MOORE, supra note 66, at 474.
78 Id.
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outcome is not enough to establish the absence of a causal relationship.
Because an act or event was not sufficient to generate a particular outcome, it does not mean that it was not necessary. Thus, it may not be
quite right to suggest that because the prohibition on torture did not end
the practice of torture, the practice of torture would have persisted in
the same way had there been no such prohibition.
What the phenomenon of redundant causation teaches us is that the
challenges involved in making causal claims are not limited to those
relating to precise measurements. Rather, the problem is that if we have
more than one possible cause for an outcome, then however precise our
measurements may be (assuming the possibility and accuracy of quantification and the like), we will at some level be attributing causation.
One might suggest, at this stage, that such a problem could exist for
causal studies regardless of whether they are cross-national. This is true.
As such, the concern posed by the phenomenon of redundant causation
would apply to studies of causality as a general matter. A regression
technique may not, by itself, give us an account of the forces and factors
necessary to provide particular kinds of causal accounts even in the case
of single-country studies. Though this may well be correct, the problem
of redundant causation becomes far more difficult to mitigate in the case
of large-N comparative constitutional studies. As we have observed,
attention to sufficiency rather than necessity encourages us to think
carefully about the precise mechanisms by which actions take place.79
We need to understand how processes occur — how, for example, the
level of torture in practice remains the same even after torture has been
legally prohibited (assuming that the identification and measurement of
torture is accurate). If we are sensitive to context and pay careful attention to the mechanisms that are interacting with one another in the
production of a certain outcome, then we hold some chance of mitigating
the concern posed by the phenomenon of redundant causation. But such
mitigation is a challenge in the case of large-N studies because, in abstracting away from context, it is hard for us to unpack the factors and
forces at play at any given moment. In other words, the extent to which
we attribute causation in such studies will be far greater not least because redundancy may well vary across contexts.
One might ask, at this stage, why we would care about how processes
take place. Why should it matter to us how torture rates are persisting
in practice despite changes on the law books? Should we not concentrate on the outcome that is generated, namely the fact that the rate of
torture remains the same? This is a fundamental and worthy question,
though it invites a relatively simple response: the reason we value
knowledge of the processes by which an outcome comes about is because
it is required for us to bring about the outcome that we care about.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
79 On the importance of mechanisms rather than general laws, see ELSTER, supra note 75, at 6–
7 (“[L]aws, even if genuinely causal, might be preempted by other mechanisms.”).
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Unless we have some understanding of how torture is working in society,
and what legal and extralegal forces are involved in its practice,
we cannot hope to eliminate torture. So we should care about the
processes — the question of how — if we actually hope to achieve the
outcome that we desire.
II. INTERPRETATION
Thus far, our discussion of positivist comparative constitutionalism
has largely addressed the problem of causality — how we think
about the relationship between inputs and outcomes. In large-scale,
cross-national analyses, we are also faced with a further issue: the interpretation of practices in different places. This is an issue to which we
shall now turn.
In thinking about issues of collective meaning and shared practices,
we may begin with a somewhat different strand of scholarship in positivist comparative constitutionalism. Consider, for example, studies that
focus on constitutional texts and the question of how we should read
and code constitutions. A valuable illustration of this scholarship is a
study by Versteeg and Professor David Law that presents “an empirical
account of the global evolution of formal constitutionalism” by using “a
comprehensive new data set covering the rights-related content of all
national constitutions in the world over the last six decades.”80 This
study concludes that ninety percent of the difference among constitutions can be explained by two variables: comprehensiveness and ideology.81 In some cases, “constitutions are succinct and tend only to contain
relatively generic rights, while others also encompass less commonly encountered, relatively esoteric provisions.”82 Secondly, while some
constitutions are “relatively libertarian,” others are “more statist in character.”83 The authors further observe that rights are becoming more
pervasive, that the explicit power of judicial review is spreading, and
that the character of rights is becoming more generic.84 Finally, the
authors use the data to place constitutions in a relative position to one
another.85 Based on the rights and duties that such texts recognize, they
can be situated on an ideological spectrum.
The question that arises with this mapping of rights variation — in
particular, the forming of a relation of content with ideology — is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism, 99
CALIF. L. REV. 1163, 1170 (2011).
81 Id. at 1233.
82 Id. at 1170.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 1194–200.
85 Id. at 1228–32.
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whether it can be undertaken without actually interpreting the constitutional text. Is it possible to know what content a right has, the kind
of role that it envisages for the state, without interpreting the right?
Without knowing what a right means, is it correct to assert that though
some constitutions “epitomize a common law tradition of negative liberty,” others “presuppose and enshrine a far-reaching role for the state
in all aspects of life”?86 The variable used during coding is binary (a
constitution either contains a particular right, say the right to free
speech, or it does not contain a particular right). Though Law and
Versteeg undertake their study with much care, this surface-level analysis of constitutional texts may potentially hide more than it reveals.
Constitutions can contain similar — even identical — expressions but
radically different rights. Indeed, on certain occasions, the specific intention will be to ensure that expressions that appear similar mean
something very different.87
This concern is captured by the qualifications in the study. The authors do not code limitation clauses, observing that “[l]imitation clauses
that purport to limit the scope of rights in a constitution, often in a
boilerplate or blanket manner, were not coded for a variety of reasons.”88
In How Constitutional Rights Matter as well, Chilton and Versteeg observe that they “did not take account of limitation clauses . . . [as] it is
usually impossible to determine the extent to which rights can actually
be limited” (p. 82). But limitation clauses — and indeed, the interpretation of limitation clauses — may result in entirely different rights. This
dynamic presents a potentially serious concern with such studies: a constitution may grant a right and then contain a range of limitations at
both the constitutional and statutory level.89 If the drafters of constitutions engage in the task of constitution-making knowing the context
within which the text will operate, then they will naturally reflect on
how the provisions that they are writing will be interpreted. The textual
similarity on the face of two or more constitutional texts hides crucial
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 1170.
For a superb study of constitutional provisions and their meaning in the context of religionstate relations, see Matthew J. Nelson, Aslı Bâli, David Mednicoff & Hanna Lerner, From Foreign
Text to Local Meaning: The Politics of Religious Exclusion in Transnational Constitutional
Borrowing, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 935 (2020).
88 Law & Versteeg, supra note 80, at 1189.
89 See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE UNION OF MYANMAR Sept. 2008,
ch. VIII, § 354; MELISSA CROUCH, THE CONSTITUTION OF MYANMAR: A CONTEXTUAL
ANALYSIS 32, 181–83 (2019). To offer a different kind of example, consider the founding of India’s
Constitution, where the constitutional text was drafted to include a variety of limitation clauses not
to limit the scope of rights but rather to define the right. See MADHAV KHOSLA, INDIA’S
FOUNDING MOMENT: THE CONSTITUTION OF A MOST SURPRISING DEMOCRACY 55–63
(2020). On limitation clauses, see generally GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE
CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION OF RIGHTS (2009).
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differences, differences that are both lost and potentially mischaracterized when reduced to a binary variable. As Tushnet has pointed out
with reference to How Constitutional Rights Matter: “Ignore limitation
clauses and you’re not measuring the presence in a constitution of constitutional rights with substantive content but rather the presence in the
constitution of certain words.”90 Moreover, this aspect of the methodology will also influence the ideological mapping that the study performs.
What is ultimately likely to ensue in the characterization of constitutional texts, given that interpretation is not independent of content, is
some degree of circularity: how one codes will determine the outcome.
The question of interpretation is thrown into sharp relief by two further studies. The first is a study of “sham constitutions.”91 Here, Law
and Versteeg proceed from the interesting and important observation
that constitutions often guarantee a great deal on paper but deliver very
little in practice. Countries can claim several protections and rights in
their constitutional texts, but their reality in practice may be hindered
by political repression and suppression. Given this fact, can we measure
the gap between constitutional guarantees in theory and in practice?
The authors draw upon the same dataset in the aforementioned
study — one that “covers the rights-related provisions of every constitution in the world over the last sixty years” — and they “assign scores
and rankings to countries that reflect the extent to which they actually
uphold the rights found in their constitutions.”92 Moreover, they “identify the constitutional rights that are most often violated in practice, the
regions where sham constitutions are most common, and variables that
predict the occurrence of sham constitutionalism.”93
As per the study, the interpretation of a constitution is a different
matter to the content of a constitution.94 But to measure “sham constitutions,” one needs to know what a constitution says. What the authors
appear to miss is that they might well be measuring variances in interpretation rather than gaps in performance. Indeed, a reading of their
own data suggests the possibility of such a supposition. In assessing
which rights are likely to be violated, they contrast women’s rights, the
prohibition against torture, the right to a fair trial, and so on, where they
find that compliance rates are low, with guarantees such as “a constitutional bar against the death penalty” which were generally honored.95
(To be more specific, the compliance rate of the prohibition of torture in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Tushnet, supra note 14.
David S. Law & Mila Versteeg, Sham Constitutions, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 863 (2013).
Id. at 871.
Id.
See id. at 875–76.
Id. at 912.
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countries with the constitutional guarantee is 12.3% whereas the compliance rate of the prohibition of the death penalty in countries with the
constitutional guarantee is 100%.96) If we reflect on this data, we may
notice that one crucial difference between, say, guarantees against torture and guarantees against the death penalty is that the latter has no
interpretive looseness: you are either dead or alive. The fact that the
death penalty is an instance of perfect compliance may well indicate
that the real problem here is not the gap between theory and practice
but rather differences in interpretation. (Of course, what we might also
be seeing here are problems with measurement — the measurement of
the death penalty is straightforward; that of torture is far more difficult.)
The downplaying of the problem of interpretation is captured even
by certain observations in the Law and Versteeg study. Consider the
following statement: “In substance, it is clearly a form of sham constitutionalism for a regime to pay lip service to the values of the global community by including the world’s most popular rights in its constitution,
only to gut those rights of meaning in the name of constitutional interpretation.”97 But, here, it is possible the authors may have the matter
backwards. The issue in this example may well not be the gutting of
rights in the name of interpretation but rather that global practices
themselves might have some kind of interpretive looseness. It is possible
for there to be genuine disagreement about the meaning of a legal provision.98 To put the point simply, the “values of the global community”
are not a social fact.
Interestingly, this issue is brought out by a different study that focuses specifically on interpretation. Observing that there can be divergent understandings over what constitutional documents convey,
Melton, Elkins, Ginsburg, and Professor Kalev Leetaru ask: “[T]o what
degree do citizens and elites agree about what constitutions say and,
assuming some variation, which factors affect relative levels of interpretability?”99 The aim of this study is to measure interpretability,
which is defined as “the ability to produce inter-subjective agreement
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. at 915.
Id. at 878 (footnote omitted). It is worth pointing out that the word “sham” may not be ideal.
There seems to be an assumption that good intentions must lead to their intended outcomes; if not,
the intentions lack integrity. But this doesn’t seem quite right. It may well be true in certain cases,
of course, but in others, state capacity, training, experience, and various other factors may well
shape the actual realization of a constitutional ideal. States that are weak and in the process of
nation building may have unrealized constitutions, but their foundational texts may not for that
reason alone be shams. As we know, rights have costs, and it is not implausible that such costs in
low-resource environments will lead to lower enforcement. On the costs of rights, see STEPHEN
HOLMES & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES
(1999).
98 See generally JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999).
99 James Melton et al., On the Interpretability of Law: Lessons from the Decoding of National
Constitutions, 43 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 399, 400 (2012).
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about the meaning of a text.”100 By making multiple coders read a constitutional text, the authors are able to show that though the interpretability of constitutions does vary, this variance is not context dependent.
“Constitutions written in bygone eras, in different languages, or in extremely different cultural milieux are,” they observe, “no less interpretable by readers than are those written in closer temporal and cultural
proximity.”101
The noticeable feature of a study of this kind, a feature revealed by
how the authors define interpretability, is that interpretability is taken
to be a technical, factual characteristic of a text. But interpretability is
not merely the same thing as agreement, which is what is actually being
measured. It is substantially different. Interpretability is a hermeneutic
enterprise involving an application of mind rather than a fact about a
text or the world that is, in some sense, existing in physical space. There
is, plainly put, no metric of “correctness” in the interpretation of a constitution. Claims regarding interpretation are often claims about how
the consensus over what a text means is incorrect. The framing of this
study makes it impossible for there to be broad-ranging agreement on
an interpretation of a text that is the wrong interpretation.102 As per
the study, it would seem to be the case that the correctness or incorrectness of an interpretation depends on how many people hold that interpretation. Interpretation, however, is not about just following what
people think a text means — one comes to one’s own interpretation of a
text using a range of techniques and methods. In this study, by contrast,
the methodology seems to have swallowed the subject of interpretation.
The risk would be that the subject matter has been redefined to accommodate the method rather than the other way around.103
If we do not attend to constitutional meaning, the potential problem
is that we may not know what is being captured. Notice, for instance,
that in the study of constitutional amendment rules that we considered
previously, we observed that the study does not account for the fact that
procedural rules could incorporate cultural attitudes and social norms.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id.
Id. at 401.
The idea that a majority of people can interpret something wrongly — that many individuals
can be in agreement over an incorrect belief — is routinely captured by puzzles and riddles, such
as, say, the Monte Hall Problem. See Steve Selvin, Letter to the Editor, A Problem in Probability,
29 AM. STATISTICIAN 67 (1975). This, of course, is a different question from objectivity in the
context of interpretation. On this matter, see generally Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth:
You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 87 (1996); and Nicos Stavropoulos, Objectivity, in
THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 315, 315–23
(Martin P. Golding & William A. Edmundson eds., 2005).
103 On reading and interpretation, one is reminded of Jorge Luis Borges’s Parable of Cervantes
and the Quixote. See JORGE LUIS BORGES, COLLECTED FICTIONS 315 (Andrew Hurley trans.,
1998). On the content and meaning of sentences, see PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF
WORDS (1989).
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It is now possible to see that there might be a further problem with this
study, one that underscores how problems relating to causality and interpretation intersect with one another in large-scale, cross-national
work — though the study acknowledges that some amendments can involve major changes (a single amendment might replace a great many
provisions), the change brought about by an amendment cannot be ascertained by merely seeing the number of provisions that are altered.
The problem is not a limitation in the factorial system. We need to
understand what the provisions mean. In certain cases, where cultural
contexts, philosophical assumptions, and linguistic traditions are sufficiently similar, what these studies might be capturing — to adopt a
Rawlsian distinction — are different conceptions of the same concept.104
Here, there may well be some overlap at work, though it would not
quite be the kind of overlap that is reducible to a binary variable. (In
principle, of course, it is possible to have a continuous variable rather
than a binary variable, but assigning precise point values would open
up another interpretive can of worms.) In other instances, however, all
that these studies might be documenting is something like the counting
of letters in a word or the counting of pages in a book — these are efforts
that do not inform us about the meaning of the word or the meaning of
the book, respectively, even though they capture similarities across some
metric. As we can see, the concern here does not relate to a coding error
and cannot be resolved by a different coding structure and new coding
rules.
With regard to the genre of positivist comparative constitutionalism
that we have been considering, it would seem that there are two possibilities. The first is that the work seems to offer us a thin rather than a
thick description of some kind of behavior. As Professor Clifford Geertz
emphasizes in The Interpretation of Cultures, thin descriptions do not
allow us to understand human activity.105 The second, potentially more
worrisome, critique would be that we are not even arriving at thin descriptions of any kind, because the concepts at work as we understand
them in one culture are different from those operating in another culture. How do we know that we are actually comparing torture across
two cultures without an assessment of how the cultures understand the
infliction of pain and the character of violence? It may well be that we
are not comparing different approaches to torture but different things.
The use and deployment of controls will not quite address this
problem because it is not a problem with the causal account that is being
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 5 (rev. ed. 1999).
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973). Drawing on Professor Gilbert Ryle, Geertz observes that when three boys contract their eyelids, they appear to be engaged in the same activity,
though each may be winking, twitching, and parodying the wink respectively. Id. at 6–7.
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offered — the problem, on this occasion, does not relate to how certain
factors interfere with the phenomenon that we are interested in studying, but instead relates to whether we are actually studying the phenomenon we are interested in studying.106 In other words, the concern here
is not measurement and the subsequent attribution of a causal account
but the very identification of something. Of course, as we have just
observed, the concerns that relate to causation and interpretation
are linked with one another in key ways — we are faced with having
both to identify and measure inputs and outcomes, as well as the forces
and factors that are interacting with one another within the chain of
causality.
We can begin to appreciate the coming together of the problems
of causation and interpretation if we notice how the positivist
approach is a form of behaviorism and seems — by externally observing
behavior — to make a science out of comparative constitutionalism.
Whether in attempting to assess the impact of torture prohibitions or in
judging the gap between rights-based guarantees and violations, the emphasis is on similarities that can be observed from without. The focus,
in other words, is on patterns rather than practices. On occasions, like
the study on amendment rules by Ginsburg and Melton, the contributions register their interest in patterns and critique other positivist work
for the ways in which patterns have been understood.107 But it is not
fully clear whether this approach can resolve matters. The answer to
an imperfect correlation may not be a better correlation if something
other than a correlation is going on. It may not be a solution if there is
a practice that is taking place. A practice is not the same as a pattern;
it cannot be reconstructed as a correlation. Because the inputs may not
correlate to how people actually think, whether the predictive power of
our work is high is somewhat beside the point. In focusing on how
matters are represented — as brute facts — this kind of positivism carries the risk of reviving Émile Durkheim’s pre-hermeneutical world,
where people can be studied as objects.108 It is in this kind of
deeper way that positivism makes a science out of comparative
constitutionalism.
The effort to respond to an imperfect correlation with a better one
has its origins in Milton Friedman’s suggestion that “theory is to be
judged by its predictive power for the class of phenomena which it is
intended to ‘explain.’ . . . [T]he only relevant test of the validity of a
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See MACINTYRE, supra note 10, at 266–67.
See, e.g., Ginsburg & Melton, supra note 28, at 702–07.
See ÉMILE DURKHEIM, THE RULES OF SOCIOLOGICAL METHOD (Steven Lukes ed.,
W.D. Halls trans., 1982). Durkheim’s own sociological practice diverged in some important respects
from his stated methodological position. On his method, see STEVEN LUKES, ÉMILE DURKHEIM:
HIS LIFE AND WORK 226–36 (1973).
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hypothesis is comparison of its predictions with experience.”109 For
Friedman, in assessing the assumptions behind a theory, one should not
attend to whether such assumptions are realistic but rather “see[]
whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently
accurate predictions.”110 But as philosophers of social science have long
argued, the Friedmanite “black-box” approach ignores the mechanism
by which outcomes are generated.111 Without attention to the mechanism at work, we cannot have confidence in the results that emerge.
What we have is pure induction rather than an explanation for what
has occurred. The concern with not knowing the internal structure by
which a phenomenon unfolds has long troubled scholars of causation.112
One of the key principles of statistical inference is that a description of
a series does not reveal how a series will unfold — a coin toss being an
easy and simple example.113 As John Maynard Keynes argues in A
Treatise on Probability, there is much reason to be careful when assessing the “mere repetition of instances.”114 “Pure [i]nduction,” Keynes
suggests, “can be usefully employed to strengthen an argument if, after
a certain number of instances have been examined, we have, from some
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
109 MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in ESSAYS IN POSITIVE
ECONOMICS 3, 8–9 (1953); see also id. at 3.
110 Id. at 15.
111 On Friedman’s essay and some questions that it implicates, see Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis,
Introduction to PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMIC THEORY 1, 2–3 (Frank Hahn & Martin Hollis
eds., 1979). For a recent critique of Friedman’s approach, see PETER SPIEGLER, BEHIND THE
MODEL: A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC MODELING 14–23 (2015).
112 See PAUL & HALL, supra note 65, at 161–68. This concern has also been a source of interest
for students of probability who have referred to it as the Gambler’s Fallacy — where the gambler
draws false inferences from prior patterns, disregarding the independence of each instance in a
series. On the Gambler’s Fallacy, see HACKING, supra note 24, at 23–36.
113 See IAN HACKING, LOGIC OF STATISTICAL INFERENCE 19–20 (1965).
114 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 272 (1921). There is, of course,
a wide body of writing that addresses methods of prediction within the law. In the case of criminal
justice, see, for example, BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING,
POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE (2007). There is a fast-growing body of
literature on similar themes in the context of new technologies. See, e.g., CATHY O’NEIL,
WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND
THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW
HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR (2018). For recent reflections
on the moral issues at stake here, see generally Benjamin Eidelson, Patterned Inequality,
Compounding Injustice, and Algorithmic Prediction, 1 AM. J.L. & EQUAL. 252 (2021); Deborah
Hellman, Big Data and Compounding Injustice, J. MORAL PHIL. (forthcoming 2022) (on file with
the Harvard Law School Library). The idea that one cannot form conclusions on the basis
of patterns without certain prior ontological commitments is a well-understood one within the
history and philosophy of science. For a classic illustration, one may recall Galileo’s study of the
Copernican and Ptolemaic systems, where the former could not, in a pre-Kepler world, be defended
simply on the patterns of planetary motions. See GALILEO GALILEI, DIALOGUE CONCERNING
THE TWO CHIEF WORLD SYSTEMS (Stephen J. Gould ed., Stillman Drake trans., Mod. Libr.
2001) (1632).
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other source, a finite probability in favour of the generalization.”115 The
key emphasis here is on “probabilities, however small, derived from some
other source.”116 Induction, by itself, cannot do the work for us.
There is now a large body of work that shows that though correlations can observe the regularity of behavior, they cannot capture the
internal logic of it. When we think of studying human behavior, we are
interested in studying the actions of rational creatures capable of thinking and reasoning: creatures who can act. Other creatures sometimes
reveal behavioral patterns that might suggest similarities with our patterns, but we view what they are doing differently from what we are
doing.117 A behaviorist analysis reveals how a certain action looks but
not how it is. The behaviorist cannot really tell us what people are
doing. The assessment of social meanings from the outside poses challenges for our work. Unless we have a sense of the underlying forces
that are resulting in an outcome that we note, we cannot know whether
the model that is being used for the analysis is reliable.118 Without such
knowledge, we are trying to interpret social behavior in some way, but
we cannot achieve an understanding of what is occurring. We cannot
come up with an explanation, because we cannot locate an event within
the actual participants and circumstances that relate to its existence.
By focusing on behavior from the outside, the positivist approach in
comparative constitutionalism carries the danger of not seeing human
actions as those performed by individual agents who reason and act in
a specific context.119 As rational beings, we have some idea of a shared
life.120 We live and function within a community; and when we follow
rules, we are engaged in a practice.121 When we are outside of the
shared agreement that constitutes rule following, it can be very hard to
comprehend the behavior of those within the community in question.
“If a lion could talk,” as Wittgenstein famously observed, “we wouldn’t
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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KEYNES, supra note 114, at 238.
Id. In the sciences, he felt, the effort was to “dispense as far as possible with the methods
of pure induction,” for rather than focusing on repetition, the emphasis was on deepening an understanding of the circumstances under which predictions take effect. Id. at 241. Indeed, Keynes
went so far as to claim that in “advanced science it is a last resort[] — the least satisfactory of the
methods.” Id.
117 See JONATHAN BENNETT, RATIONALITY 15, 18 (1989). When we compare human beings
with honey bees, Jonathan Bennett notes: “It does look on the face of it as though we can say of
honey-bees that their dancing behaviour is covered by rules, but not that honey-bees have rules
according to which they dance. Or in other words although the dancing behaviour of bees is regular,
it is not rule-guided. . . . We cannot say that bees have rules unless they somehow manifest an
awareness of their rules as rules.” Id.
118 SPIEGLER, supra note 111, at 40–42.
119 See generally GEOFFREY HAWTHORN, PLAUSIBLE WORLDS 18–26, 34–37 (1991).
120 See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS pt. 1, ¶¶ 85, 140, 153–
154, 241 (G.E.M. Anscombe et al. trans., rev. 4th ed. 2009); see also S. STEPHEN HILMY, THE
LATER WITTGENSTEIN 67–137 (1987).
121 WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 120, pt. 1, ¶¶ 200–202, 241.
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be able to understand it.”122 There is a kind of argument about what it
means to understand a practice; to understand how it has meaning for
individuals. This is the reason why one can have the same referent but
understand matters in a very different way.123 We cannot do very much
with a description of similar patterns without certain background
ontological assumptions, and the idea of similarity misses the thought
that there can be tremendous behaviorist consensus alongside great
disagreement over meaning. Studies in positivist comparative constitutionalism — whether on torture prohibitions, sham constitutions,
constitutional interpretability, and the like — do not seem to fully appreciate how an orbit of shared meaning contains concepts within it.
These concepts can be grasped only in relation to other concepts within
that orbit, and one needs to be under the same orbit of meaning to understand the concepts. It is only then that we can formulate some sense
of the actions that people are engaged in.124
If we do not see actions as having a cognitive content, if we see them
as mere behavior, then it is akin to seeing the physical acts that people
perform — raising their hand at a faculty meeting or falling down after
walking on ice — and forming an opinion of what they are doing or how
they are thinking. There is no accounting for the internal reasons that
persons have, their forms of deliberation, or their kinds of motivations.
As a result, there can be no appreciation for a person’s reasons for action
in any given instance and thereby no explanation for their actions.125
Under such accounts, humans are not conceptualized as agents. They
are not seen as beings who have motives and purposes, who form intentions and act on them. In other words, humans are not taken to be
conscious beings.126 As lawyers, we must be especially attentive to this
not least because individual agency is so central to our legal world. It
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See WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT 23–71 (MIT Press 2013) (1960)
(for Professor Quine’s well-known “Rabbit” and “Gavagai” example).
124 See PETER WINCH, THE IDEA OF A SOCIAL SCIENCE AND ITS RELATION TO
PHILOSOPHY (1958); 2 CHARLES TAYLOR, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 15 (1985). On the societal construction of individual
identity, see JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Discourse on the Origin and the Foundations of
Inequality Among Men, in THE DISCOURSES AND OTHER EARLY POLITICAL WRITINGS 115
(Victor Gourevitch trans. & ed., 2019).
125 See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Internal and External Reasons, in MORAL LUCK:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1973–1980, at 101, 106–07, 111 (1981) (discussing the limits of external
reasons to explain action).
126 For a critique along such lines, see generally CHARLES TAYLOR, THE EXPLANATION OF
BEHAVIOUR (1964); 1 CHARLES TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?, in HUMAN AGENCY AND
LANGUAGE 15 (1985) [hereinafter TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?]. For a recent reflection on
respecting persons within the social sciences, see generally Michael L. Frazer, Respect for Subjects
in the Ethics of Causal and Interpretive Social Explanation, 114 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1001 (2020).
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is at the heart of our understanding of the rule of law and legal procedures, across their varying conceptions.127 It is an idea that also finds
articulation in legal doctrine across a range of areas. When, to offer
merely one example from public law, Germany’s Federal Constitutional
Court refused to permit an aircraft with innocent passengers to be shot
down to save other lives, it did so because the impugned law did not
take seriously the individuality — the dignity and agency — of the passengers on the aircraft.128 Cases such as these sit uneasily within the
positivist vision. For the positivist, the ideas of responsibility and
agency are hard to acknowledge because the domain of internal reasons
is deemphasized. In reality, however, our behavior cannot be assessed
from the outside because it does not exist or operate independently of
our understanding. Rules that are made by and that apply to human
beings — including legal rules — do not operate in a cognitive vacuum.
III. COMPARATIVISM AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
The questions that How Constitutional Rights Matter and other positivist scholarship ask are of profound significance. Importantly, however, the reason why such work might concern us is not only because of
its methods and findings, but also because it carries fundamental implications for legal rules and institutions in society. One of the key features
of the social sciences is that, in studying meaning, we also generate
meaning for our own lives.129 The projects we pursue, the surveys we
undertake, and the data we decipher are themselves sources of meaning.
And, in becoming sources of meaning, they become guides to our conduct. Thus, when we conclude that torture prohibitions do not impact
the practice of torture, that conclusion shapes our understanding of the
value of such prohibitions. When we believe that the correct or incorrect
reading of a constitutional text has nothing to do with interpretation,
that belief alters how we understand such texts.
There are two reasons why the social sciences pose a special challenge. The first reason is that the enterprise that is being undertaken —
the very doing of comparative constitutional law — is absorbed into
what provides meaning. When torture is being studied in a country, it
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
127 See generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 91–97 (1944); LON L. FULLER, THE
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of agency has recently acquired importance for legal scholars in the context of artificial intelligence.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Lecture, The Deformation of Contract in the Information Society, 37
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 505, 511–13 (2017).
128 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 15, 2006, 115
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 118.
129 See TAYLOR, What is Human Agency?, supra note 126.
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means that human beings are studying other human beings. This is the
key difference between the physical and social sciences — and one that
is crucial to highlight in reflecting on the enterprise of comparative constitutionalism. In the former case, the objects of study do not pick up
the methodology and knowledge that is at work.130 In physics, for example, the planets themselves do not incorporate an understanding of
science. Because human beings act in the world, the principles that they
incorporate and the activities that they perform feed into one another.131
The second reason is that, as human beings, we can act differently.
We ourselves are agents, capable of behaving in ways that are different
from the ways in which the people that we study have behaved. Legal
theorists have long been attentive to this fact. As Professors H.L.A.
Hart and Tony Honoré put it in their seminal work Causation in the
Law: “The idea that individuals are primarily responsible for the harm
which their actions are sufficient to produce without the intervention of
others or of extraordinary natural events is important, not merely to law
and morality, but to the preservation of something else of great moment
in human life.”132 Within the law, we acknowledge — across a range of
domains — that individuals are separate persons and that they can act
distinctly.133 When we think about legal responsibility, we think about
how the individual whom we choose to hold responsible exercised their
own judgment and performed their own actions.134 The emphasis is
true even for constitution makers, who often internalize the legal reality
that is present in another country and differentiate it as part of a process
that is also mimetic — a fact that is hard to capture if we focus on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
130 See WINCH, supra note 124, at 113–20. Even those who do not quite embrace Quine’s worries about translation emphasize how humans cannot be studied as objects. See HILARY PUTNAM,
MEANING AND THE MORAL SCIENCES 66–77 (1978).
131 A helpful example of this is Max Weber’s study of stock exchanges. See generally Max Weber,
Stock and Commodity Exchanges, 29 THEORY & SOC’Y 305 (2000).
132 HART & HONORÉ, supra note 75, at lxxx.
133 In antidiscrimination law, for example, we care greatly about why a seeming discriminator
treats someone in a certain way, rather than merely how the seeming discriminator treats them. See
John Gardner, Discrimination: The Good, the Bad, and the Wrongful, 118 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN
SOC’Y 55, 58 (2018). For a recent reflection on what individualism demands in the context of race,
see generally Benjamin Eidelson, Respect, Individualism, and Colorblindness, 129 YALE L.J. 1600
(2020).
134 For a helpful reflection on this in the context of statistical evidence and the burden of proof,
see Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Law, Fact or Justice?, 66 B.U. L. REV. 487, 499 (1986) (“As a principle
for the imposition of responsibility, corporate punishment is characterized by the assumption that
it is justified to hold an entire group responsible for the transgressions of its individual members.
Our moral and legal values strongly resist this principle because it fails to acknowledge that the
individual is entitled to judgment on their own actions. . . . Judgments based on naked statistical
distributions openly acknowledge that the individual defendant may well belong to the innocent
minority, and therefore undermine the citizen’s confidence that the legal system will protect him
from mistaken conviction of crime or mistaken imposition of liability.” (footnotes omitted)).
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behavior and compare patterns, as if legal events in two separate countries are two entirely independent events and are two natural responses
to randomly occurring underlying conditions.135
Even those who have been skeptical of the establishment of causal
relations have had to confront the reality of human experience. David
Hume, who saw that relations of causation had an air of mystery to
them, acknowledged that one simply had to accept the limits of philosophy if one needed to acknowledge what it meant to be human.
Imagining that we cannot attribute meaning and causal relations to our
actions will fill us with “the deepest darkness”;136 one will feel “utterly
depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty.”137 Instead, Hume
suggested, one needed to look the other way — “play a game of backgammon” — when one was burdened by trying to explain the world.138
Hume grasped that even if something cannot be fully explained philosophically, it might still play some role in our life because of some kind
of human necessity. Even if we could not quite understand how causal
relations work in theory, we would need some account of causation to
function in the practical world. Without some kind of an explanation
to ourselves about how one event leads to another, we would have no
way to live. Because the positivist comparative constitutional lawyer
seems to eschew explanations of how outcomes emerge, they carry the
risk of abandoning the idea of agency.139 But, as Hume pressed upon
us, without agency, we would struggle to have an account of how to live
our own lives.
The concerns that I have identified may have some validity to them,
but they raise the question of what is possible within comparative constitutional law. In exploring this, the starting point lies in underscoring
the importance of studying societies from within — in moving beyond
behavior. If one views external practices and study systems from without, one risks concluding that people are doing the same thing by virtue

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
135 In this sense, the methodological questions here are not entirely the same as those that occur
with respect to randomized control trials, though important philosophical similarities exist. On
such trials, see generally Angus Deaton, Instruments, Randomization, and Learning About
Development, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 424 (2010); Angus Deaton & Nancy Cartwright,
Understanding and Misunderstanding Randomized Controlled Trials, 210 SOC. SCI. & MED. 2
(2018); Angus Deaton, Introduction: Randomization in the Tropics Revisited, a Theme and Eleven
Variations, in RANDOMIZED CONTROL TRIALS IN THE FIELD OF DEVELOPMENT: A
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE 29 (Florent Bédécarrats et al. eds., 2020).
136 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 269 (L.A. Selby-Bigge ed., 1978) (1739).
137 Id.
138 Id.; see also F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 127 (Ronald Hamowy ed.,
2011) (on the human tendency to presume that our actions have consequences).
139 See generally Sanjay G. Reddy, What Is an Explanation? Statistical Physics and Economics,
229 EUR. PHYSICAL J. SPECIAL TOPICS 1645 (2020).
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of the fact that they might appear to be doing the same thing.140 A turn
to context does not only promise us a fuller account of what might be
taking place in any country. It also is truer to our commitment to constitutionalism. After all, constitutionalism, in its modern democratic
sense, is about finding the legal ways by which we can empower ourselves, exercise agency, and structure our collective life.141 The means
by which agency can be enabled — how sovereignty can be expressed;
how amendment rules should be written; how the relationship between
representation and the people might be framed — is, and rightly so, the
central preoccupation of constitutional law scholarship.142 Indeed, the
reality of constitutionalism only heightens the importance of context because the practices at work are normative; they are a form of political
agency in action. Recall the study of constitutional amendment rules,
where we observed how rules might assimilate extralegal norms. We
noted how this study illuminates concerns relating to both causality and
interpretation, and their relationship with one another. In recognizing
how the actors in a constitutional order might incorporate the constitutional culture that exists — procedural rules, we observed, cannot be
examined independently of this culture — we can also notice the force
of the agency-related argument that we have been emphasizing, and the
mutuality between the considerations pertaining to causality, interpretation, and agency. Rules exist in a space where actors think, change,
and act. By adopting a behaviorist lens that is bounded in time and
space, we risk losing sight of the idea that humans not only are present
in the world but also act in it. To appreciate the latter — to see how
humans internalize laws — one needs to study how humans think and
understand, how they create and form meaning.
In studying societies from within, there are two possible ways in
which we might proceed. The first approach adopts a perspective that
is internal to a legal system. It usually focuses on doctrinal research,
and attends to the inner logic and structure of legal reasoning and legal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
140 The emerging world of comparative constitutional law risks leaving us with a new kind of
occasionalism. Occasionalism was an attempt to understand, among other things, the relationship
between the mind and the body. How is the mind able to control the body? The supposition was
put forth that God is the only spirit that can cross the mind-body distinction, and that therefore
explains how our mental intentions (I want to move my arm) and physical actions (I move my arm)
can coexist. The explanation of God’s role is supported by a clear one-to-one correlation. On
occasionalism and its many facets, see generally STEVEN NADLER, OCCASIONALISM:
CAUSATION AMONG THE CARTESIANS (2010).
141 See generally STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON THE THEORY OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 134–77 (1995); RICHARD TUCK, THE SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE
INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY (2016); JEREMY WALDRON, POLITICAL POLITICAL
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 23–44 (2016).
142 On popular sovereignty and constitutionalism, see generally David Singh Grewal & Jedediah
Purdy, The Original Theory of Constitutionalism, 127 YALE L.J. 664 (2018) (reviewing TUCK, supra
note 141).
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systems.143 Here, comparative research proceeds on the basis that two
or more countries have sufficiently similar legal rules and modes of legal
argument such that it is intelligible and reasonable to contrast them.
The goal here is to better understand one’s legal system as well as to see
how legal doctrine within one’s system can evolve. The emphasis in
such work is typically on legal interpretation as we traditionally understand it. That is to say, our attention is on how one should understand
the meaning of a particular constitutional provision within one’s legal
system.144 As we know, the judicial invocation of such an approach has
not been without controversy, especially in the United States.145 But
such critiques are misguided for they see foreign law as extralegal and
therefore illegitimate, missing the distinction that Hart once made
between sources of law that are mandatory and those that are nonmandatory but nonetheless legitimate.146 What is important is not
whether a court cites a foreign case but rather what reasons it offers to
justify that citation. The assessment of those reasons is itself a matter
of reasoning; and this is true not merely for the citation of foreign materials but for all nonbinding sources. A wide body of literature has
helped us appreciate how doctrinally oriented research might be performed in the context of comparative constitutional law; how judges,
lawyers, and scholars might engage with legal materials from legal systems other than their own.147 And in the courtroom, such practices continue to flourish globally.148
A second approach is one that is internal to a particular country or
set of countries but external to legal doctrine. This approach begins
from the premise that constitutions arise and operate in specific contexts,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
143 On doctrinal research, see generally MÁTYÁS BÓDIG, LEGAL DOCTRINAL SCHOLARSHIP:
LEGAL THEORY AND THE INNER WORKINGS OF A DOCTRINAL DISCIPLINE (2021).
144 See Theunis Roux, Comparative Public Law, in RESEARCHING PUBLIC LAW IN COMMON
LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS (Paul Daly & Joe Tomlinson eds., forthcoming 2022) (on file with author).
145 See Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term — Foreword: A Political Court, 119
HARV. L. REV. 31, 86 (2005) (“If foreign decisions are freely citable, any judge wanting a supporting
citation has only to troll deeply enough in the world’s corpora juris to find it.”).
146 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 294 (2d ed. 1994) (on “‘permissive’ legal sources”).
On such sources, see John Gardner, Concerning Permissive Sources and Gaps, 8 OXFORD J. LEGAL
STUD. 457 (1988).
147 See generally Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory
of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999); Vicki C. Jackson,
Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005);
Cheryl Saunders, The Use and Misuse of Comparative Constitutional Law, 13 IND. J. GLOB.
LEGAL STUD. 37 (2006); Rosalind Dixon, A Democratic Theory of Constitutional Comparison, 56
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 947 (2008); JEREMY WALDRON, “PARTLY LAWS COMMON TO ALL
MANKIND”: FOREIGN LAW IN AMERICAN COURTS (2012).
148 A noticeable recent example is the Jamaican Supreme Court’s engagement with the Indian
Supreme Court’s doctrine on the question of data collection and privacy. See Julian J. Robinson v.
Attorney General of Jamaica, Supreme Court of Judicature of Jamaica, [2019] JMFC Full 04, ¶¶
328–341.
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and considers the relationship between legal developments and historical, sociological, and political changes.149 Rather than focusing on
courts and on case law, such work attends to questions of power and
legitimacy, to the role of incentives and ideologies, to the workings of
social forces and civil society, and to historical pressures and trends. It
will, of course, be important for this work to attend to legal doctrine,
though the extent of attention is likely to vary across different studies.
Recently, scholars have noted the need to ensure that comparative constitutional law is not entirely subsumed within external accounts of legal
developments,150 and there is of course a long tradition of thought that
explores how any truly explanatory account of the workings of the law
in society will have to be sensitive to the internal structure of legal argumentation.151 Although doctrine will play some role in external accounts, the character of legal reasoning and legal developments will
usually be understood as a subset of, and/or sharing a dynamic relationship with, the broader realities within a society. Instead of focusing
exclusively or even primarily on the inner life of the law, the attempt
within this approach will be to unmask what are understood to be the
real forces that drive change and shape outcomes. Here, as in the case
of doctrinally oriented work, the field of comparative constitutionalism
has evolved with both single-country studies — which enable the field
to grow through comparative judgments that might be formed by studying these different single-country studies — as well as studies where
more than a single jurisdiction is considered. The countries that are
contrasted may, as is familiar to social scientists, be similar and different
in various ways. The key point is that they are considered to be comparable with reference to a particular metric — one identified based on
the question under consideration — and that the study is sensitive to
the contexts of the jurisdictions under study.
Though the distinction between studying countries from within and
without — the latter being the Martian perspective — is relatively
underdeveloped in comparative constitutionalism, the distinction between internal “legal-interpretive” approaches and external “causalexplanatory” accounts is well established in the field.152 Each approach
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
149 See HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 6 (“The future of comparative constitutional inquiry as a field
of study . . . lies in relaxing the sharp divide between constitutional law and the social sciences, in
order to enrich both.”)
150 See Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 116–19; Roux, supra note 7, at 131–34.
151 See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 11–15 (1986).
152 On the distinction between internal “legal-interpretive” approaches and external “causalexplanatory” accounts in the context of comparative constitutionalism, see Roux, supra note 7, at
124–34. See also Gardbaum, supra note 7, at 111 (distinguishing between “constitutional law” and
“constitutional politics”). On the internal-external distinction in the study of law, see generally
Richard L. Schwartz, Internal and External Method in the Study of Law, 11 LAW & PHIL. 179
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has a long and venerable tradition. With regard to the former approach,
the practice of foreign engagement in doctrinal contexts — as Professor
Vicki Jackson once reminded us — goes back in the United States to at
least the late nineteenth century.153 In studying this practice, we hold
the promise of furthering our understanding of how participants behave
within a legal system. As regards the latter approach, the comparativist
turn in the nineteenth century offers us a range of examples stretching
from Henry Maine to James Bryce who compared legal systems and
governance structures in different historical and institutional ways.154
There are various means by which external “causal-explanatory” accounts might be developed, and these include the use of empirical,
statistical, and quantitative methodologies. What is crucial is not
whether one brings, say, an ethnographic or a historical or a statistical
approach — each of these will have something to add and each of them
will carry their own shortcomings. Similarly, what is important is not
whether the research focuses on how nonlegal actors approach the law
or on whether one tries to explain social and institutional changes over
time. Rather, what is key to such accounts is the effort to understand a
country within its context.155 Consider, for example, four books on judicial power that are each crucial contributions to our comparative understanding of courts: Ginsburg’s Judicial Review in New Democracies,
Professor Ran Hirschl’s Towards Juristocracy, Professor Samuel
Issacharoff’s Fragile Democracies, and Professor Theunis Roux’s The
Politico-Legal Dynamics of Judicial Review.156 Each work presents an
account of the growth and workings of judicial power in different
terms — crudely put, Ginsburg and Hirschl focus more on the overall
power dynamics in society, whereas Issacharoff and Roux pay more attention to legal practices. We might find the arguments in one work
more persuasive than the arguments in another, and we might find each
work persuasive and unpersuasive in different ways. What is noteworthy, however, is that each of these works takes the idea of a case study
seriously, even when the works offer multiple case studies.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
(1992); Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Internal/External Distinction and the Notion of a “Practice” in
Legal Theory and Sociolegal Studies, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 163 (1996).
153 Jackson, supra note 147, at 109.
154 See STEFAN COLLINI ET AL., THAT NOBLE SCIENCE OF POLITICS: A STUDY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 207–46 (1983).
155 On contextualism, see generally Tushnet, supra note 7.
156 TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL
COURTS IN ASIAN CASES (2003); RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS
AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004); SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF,
FRAGILE DEMOCRACIES: CONTESTED POWER IN THE ERA OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
(2015); THEUNIS ROUX, THE POLITICO-LEGAL DYNAMICS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2018).
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The two approaches — the “legal-interpretive” and the “causalexplanatory” — are not without their methodological concerns and limitations. Those who favor the former will often worry that the latter
pays insufficient attention to what people are actually doing when they
are making legal claims and delivering legal judgments. Those who are
partial to the latter will usually emphasize the importance of seeing the
law as a product of its broader sociopolitical context. When it comes to
comparative constitutionalism, in particular, scholars must not only negotiate the truths on either side of these approaches but also confront
the problem of comparison as a more general conceptual challenge.157
Comparative constitutionalism is a difficult enterprise because it is not
always clear that the modes of interpretation in one jurisdiction have
similarity with those of another. There are several concrete particularities — cultural, hermeneutic, institutional, and so on — that are often
idiosyncratic to a particular system.158 This poses challenges for both
the identification of a practice and the establishment of causality. But
the difficulty of the enterprise need not call on us to deny all possibilities
of comparative constitutionalism. If we move away from abstraction
and try to understand countries from within, we hold the prospect of
forming enough learning that we can exercise a certain interpretive
charity, make certain comparisons between countries, and come to certain judgments.159 There is no objective metric, of course, to determine
when one arrives at the confidence necessary to undertake a certain kind
of analysis, when one feels satisfied with the account that one is providing.160 Indeed, judgment calls of such kinds are central to the very enterprise of scholarship. The possible methodologies that we may use
include, of course, ones that are quantitative and ones that involve more
than a single country. What is required is not perfection in these endeavors, but rather an engagement with the material in ways that are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157 The struggle over comparisons has been central to several philosophical debates, perhaps
most notably in the context of utilitarianism. For an early challenge to the idea of comparability,
see JOHN GROTE, AN EXAMINATION OF THE UTILITARIAN PHILOSOPHY 47–56 (1870). See
generally Barry Stroud, Mind, Meaning, and Practice, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
WITTGENSTEIN 281, 291–304 (Hans Sluga & David G. Stern eds., 2d ed. 2018) (for a reflection on
the philosophical challenge at hand). Most recently, the question has arisen in debates over justice.
See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE (2009); Eric Beerbohm, The Conceptual Priority of
Injustice, 5 JURISPRUDENCE 329 (2014) (on the relationship between transcendental and comparative approaches).
158 This has sometimes led to a rather extreme position that raises concerns for all kinds of comparative work. See, e.g., PIERRE LEGRAND, FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE (1999); Pierre
Legrand, Econocentrism, 59 UNIV. TORONTO L.J. 215 (2009).
159 On interpretive charity, see QUINE, supra note 123, at 52–55.
160 One is reminded in this context of Professor Herbert Simon’s idea of satisficing. See
HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION, at xxiv–xxvii (2d ed. 1957); HERBERT A.
SIMON, MODELS OF MAN: SOCIAL AND RATIONAL; MATHEMATICAL ESSAYS ON RATIONAL
HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN SOCIETY SETTING 204–06 (1957).
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sensitive to specific contexts and an appreciation of which kinds of questions might work for which kinds of methodologies. As Professor Angus
Deaton observes: “Context is always important, and we must adapt our
methods to the problem at hand.”161
Moving beyond the Martian standpoint will not fully resolve concerns relating to causation, interpretation, and agency. However, the
closer our attention to context, the greater is our chance of mitigating
some of the problems that these concerns pose. If we are to take the
task of such mitigation seriously, there seem to be real challenges with
“large-N” analyses that involve an abstraction from context. In principle, “large-N” work is possible when all the data points are generated
from the same data-generating process. We can estimate with greater
precision when we have a greater “N.” The problem of comparability,
however, makes such work hard. We cannot satisfy the assumption that
the data under study is produced through the same process, and the
requirement that the variables are the same.162 The countries across the
world vary in ways that, however precise our controls might be, make
it hard to identify shared practices and attribute causation with reasonable confidence from without — our assumptions and ascriptions are
simply too great. Given cross-national differences, it is not entirely clear
that a larger sample is better than a smaller one: by entering new countries into the sample, we increase the potential comparability challenges.
Every new country brings with it a new context. If we do believe that
legal rules, cultural forces, and interpretive practices vary across the
world, then “large-N” work may not be all that different from gluing
together different sample sets. Perhaps the most compelling argument
in favor of large-N work is that by broadening the inquiry, such work
can help us in moving beyond selection biases.163 Though “large-N”
work may well help to reduce selection biases, a better answer to such
a concern might lie in separate analyses for different parts.
Though the “large-N” approach — the “primary method” (p. 102)
deployed — in How Constitutional Rights Matter may not quite be successful, the book has many virtues. As we can see, it broadens the methodological conversation within comparative constitutionalism. The use
of statistical analyses, in particular, has been relatively underdeveloped
in contrast with other approaches in the field, and How Constitutional
Rights Matter will encourage us to reflect on the uses of such
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
161 Deaton, Introduction: Randomization in the Tropics Revisited: A Theme and Eleven
Variations, supra note 135, at 29.
162 Debates around such matters are familiar in the social sciences. For a superb reflection on
related themes, see RETHINKING SOCIAL INQUIRY: DIVERSE TOOLS, SHARED STANDARDS
(Henry E. Brady & David Collier eds., 2004).
163 See HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 231.
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methods — and perhaps use them in contextually grounded ways.164
Furthermore, the work makes a contribution by offering certain kinds
of data and patterns that raise fascinating questions, even if it is not
quite successful in the explanatory answers that are offered. By urging
us to think more carefully about the impact that laws and institutions
have, the book is likely to serve a major generative role.
We may conclude with a rather revealing hypothetical that Hirschl
offers in support of “large-N” analyses. Hirschl — who is sensitive to
the potential concerns with “large-N” work and its limitations with regard to demonstrating causality — puts forth the following thought
experiment:
Consider the study of nutritious, healthy eating. . . . [D]espite all the
important differences among them, most human beings feed on one
combination or another of grains, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, and
protein-rich foods. Thus, no one in their right mind would dismiss credible
studies that highlight a general, cross-cultural risk in the frequent consumption of foods rich in trans fats.165

The striking feature about this hypothetical is that it is about the
human body rather than the human mind. For reasons that I have tried
to underline, it may be more fruitful for comparative constitutionalism
to instead focus on the human mind, to start from the premise that humans are agents and that constitutionalism is an act of collective agency.
Working from such premises will allow us to understand the complexity
of our legal practices and our legal institutions; and it will recognize that
we have the power to change them. Unlike planets, our lives are not
yoked to the laws of physics.166 The study of comparative constitutional
law is a study of the laws of society, not the laws of science. The world
of institutions and rights is no straightforward one — institutions and
rights work and don’t work for a range of reasons, under conditions and
factors that are interactive and that vary over time and space. The
positivist approach to comparative constitutionalism tries to shed light
on legal phenomena, but it leaves wide open the possibility that something else might be going on. A turn to context could help us understand
what that might be.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
164 It may well be that, in turning away from abstraction, we will ask slightly different questions
from those that are sometimes posed — after all, specific methods often carry with them the potentiality of specific kinds of inquiries.
165 HIRSCHL, supra note 7, at 276.
166 See Jackson, supra note 7, at 1373 (“I wonder — and worry — whether the newly popular
phrase, ‘constitutional design’ has connotations of engineering; is ‘comparative constitutional studies,’ . . . a form of — if not engineering — legal physics?” (footnotes omitted)).

